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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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stakeholder-driven performance management.  He provides investment and portfolio management 
support to Government sponsors.  Buck has a BS in Marine Transportation from the U.S. Merchant 
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Author: Diane P. M. Hanf co-leads research of web services performance in operational environments.  
She provides modeling and analysis, software acquisition, and test and evaluation support to Government 
sponsors.  Hanf has Bachelor’s degrees in Electrical Engineering, Wire Communications Technology and 




While Service-oriented Architecture (SOA)1 can help organizations share resources and 
leverage economies-of-scale, it can increase acquisition complexity (e.g., multiple new/different 
relationships to manage) and uncertainty (e.g., nature/magnitude of future service demands).  
Given this additional complexity and uncertainty, MITRE developed a performance management 
framework to help Government organizations measurably: 
 Articulate SOA outcomes and identify outcome drivers; 
 Define SOA technical and acquisition performance metrics through the application of 
Return-on-Investment (ROI) principles and monitor performance as a comparison of 
current delivery to initial ROI expectations; 
 Translate SOA objectives into contractor performance management mechanisms. 
This paper describes applying ROI analysis principles for SOA performance 
management, creating Service-level Agreements (SLAs) to articulate agreements between the 
Government and external service providers, and managing SLAs through a governance 
framework (Hanf & Buck, 2009, March). 
This white paper highlights key findings of research undertaken by The MITRE 
Corporation (MITRE) and the resulting recommendations for (1) applying Return-on-Investment 
(ROI) analysis principles as the foundation for more effective performance management of 
Government Service-oriented Architecture (SOA), (2) creating comprehensive Service-level 
Agreements (SLAs) to articulate agreements between the Government and external service 
providers, and (3) managing SLAs through a governance framework (Oakley-Bogdewic & Buck, 
2009; Hanf & Buck, 2009, March 25).  As illustrated in Figure 1, MITRE’s recommendations 
address the additional managerial complexity and uncertainty that SOA objectives and 
proposed solutions often create. 
                                                
1 SOA is an architectural style that guides all aspects of creating/applying business processes through 
service packaging and defines/provisions the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure (Newcomer & 
Lomow, 2005).  
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Figure 1. Key Aspects of MITRE’s Research 
1.0  The Importance of Performance Management  
Mechanisms are currently not consistently in place within the Federal Government for 
programs to identify key stakeholders, quantitatively articulate stakeholder needs, and 
quantifiably assess, on a timely basis, whether stakeholder needs have been satisfied.  The 
new Administration is currently focused on a key symptom of such improperly functioning 
mechanisms: lack of transparent accountability. President Barack Obama explained:   
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented 
level of openness in Government.  We will work together to ensure the 
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, 
and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and 
promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.  Government 
should be transparent.  Transparency promotes accountability and 
provides information for citizens about what their Government is doing. 
 Information maintained by the Federal Government is a national 
asset. My Administration will take appropriate action, consistent with law 
and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms that the public can 
readily find and use. Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies to 
put information about their operations and decisions online and readily available to the 
public. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public feedback to identify 
information of greatest use to the public. (2009) 
  Over the past year, lackluster demonstration of effective Government performance has 
resulted in the establishment of new regulations/requirements that compel agencies to more 
frequently and credibly communicate the value delivered by Government programs in exchange 
for funds provided by stakeholders.  The requirement for a Performance Improvement Officer is 
one of the provisions of an executive order signed on November 13, 2007, to compel agencies 
to derive better results from their programs.  Agencies will now be required to demonstrate 
robust performance management efforts, including the development or improvement of strategic 
plans and aggressive and accurate measurement of progress in achieving overarching 
performance goals.    
Current reporting requirements for programs and expenditures will likely be more closely 
scrutinized for realism, consistency, accuracy, and alignment with strategic objectives.  The 
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Comptroller General asks federal programs and agencies to improve performance management 
by:  
 Comprehensively reassessing what the federal government does and how it does it: 
reconsidering whether to terminate or revise outdated programs or services 
provided. 
 Reexamining the beneficiaries of federal programs: reconsidering who is eligible for, 
pays for, and/or benefits from a particular program to maximize federal investments. 
 Improving economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal operations: capturing 
opportunities to reduce costs through restructuring and streamlining federal activities. 
 Attacking activities at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement: focusing on 
minimizing risks and costs. (Mihm, 2000, July 20) 
Regardless of whether government programs operate in Information Technology (IT)-
intensive environments or not, there is increasing momentum toward sharing of resources, 
solutions, and risks across government organizations/Agencies.  While this trend supports 
leveraging synergy, reducing stovepipes/redundancy, and economies-of-scale, it often 
increases acquisition complexity (e.g., multiple new and different relationships to manage) and 
uncertainty (e.g., nature and magnitude of future demands for supplies/services that are 
currently being acquired).  Given the increased emphasis on transparency and accountability for 
Federal government expenditures to our ultimate stakeholders (e.g., the taxpayer) in an 
environment with increased acquisition complexity and uncertainty, foundational steps that we 
recommend include: 
a) Understanding an organization’s own performance with respect to its stakeholders’ 
expectations,  
b) Finding ways to effectively communicate performance in the right form and at the 
right time to ultimate stakeholders.  This allows for expectations to be effectively 
managed and/or course corrections to be accomplished before resources are 
unnecessarily expended for too long on objectives that are no longer worthwhile or 
on solutions that will not succeed, and  
c) Establishing mechanisms to readily re-calibrate performance needs/expectations as 
the future becomes less uncertain.   
We discuss the following recommendations in the context of an SOA environment: 
 Application of an ROI-based performance management framework to support 
sponsors in aligning operational and contract-related performance metrics with 
monetizable and non-monetizable costs, benefits, and risks deemed critical for 
achievement of desired outcomes, 
 A performance execution process based on SLAs as a key means of communicating 
and monitoring performance, and  
 An SLA governance framework that enables decision-makers to manage SLAs as an 
on-going re-evaluation of what performance matters to stakeholders. 
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2.0  SOA Performance Management 
As Federal Government agencies transform their enterprises to be service-oriented, a 
disciplined process to effectively and efficiently manage both operational 
and service provider performance has yet to be widely embraced.  In the 
absence of such a process, program and portfolio managers are often 
challenged to clearly and measurably connect SOA stakeholder needs, 
desired outcomes, and operational, technical, and service provisioning 
performance.  As is 
illustrated in Figure 2-1, 
SOA is an architectural 
approach used to build 
solutions that contain a 
set of services, service 
consumers, service producers and service 
contracts (Logan, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 2-1. The SOA Construct 
Through Government case observations and investigation of methodologies successfully 
employed within commercial industry, the MITRE research team developed a performance 
management framework—discussed later and shown in Figure 4-1—which guides framework 
users (e.g., multiple SOA participants in different stages of the SOA lifecycle) through key 
decisions that will need to be made in effectively and efficiently managing performance of SOA 
implementations.  The SOA (Newcomer & Lomow, 2005) performance management framework 
helps Government portfolio/program managers and system/performance engineers: 
 Measurably articulate expected SOA outcomes and identify outcome drivers, 
 Define and monitor technical and acquisition performance metrics through the 
application of Return-on-Investment (ROI) principles and the on-going comparison of 
current delivery to initial SOA ROI expectations, and 
 Effectively translate operational and overarching government SOA performance 
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MITRE’s recommendations target critical challenges associated with the increased 
complexity and uncertainty that are often created by SOA. They also mitigate the risk of 
measurement overload (i.e., “losing the forest for the trees”) by providing a mechanism to derive 
vital and coherent outcome-focused metrics.  These critical challenges are summarized in the 
paragraphs that follow:      
Expectations of Savings without Analysis 
For Government agencies and programs that have made decisions to adopt SOA, robust 
and repeatable methods for effectively and efficiently managing performance over the lifecycle 
have not emerged.  For many Federal Government organizations, there is a mindset that, 
because SOA is mandated, rigorous investment analysis/management is not necessarily an 
urgent requirement.  The expectation that SOA will save money has resulted in already 
decreasing funding profiles for programs, increasing the criticality of developing and applying 
methodologies that result in selection of cost-effective strategies and solutions.  These 
methodologies should directly relate to fulfilling stakeholder needs, closing capability gaps, and 
achieving multiple outcomes.   
Understanding the SOA Lifecycle 
One challenge in effectively managing SOA performance is the lack of relevant SOA 
lifecycle performance benchmarks that Government programs can leverage to determine 
realistic SOA outcomes and performance thresholds.  This lack increases the degree of 
uncertainty regarding what can realistically be expected from SOA.  The current lack of 
benchmarks is primarily a symptom that (a) many sponsors are still in the initial planning or 
development stages with SOA and do not have on-going, steady-state results to share yet, and 
(b) those organizations that do have steady-state performance results often consider the 
information to be proprietary, requiring close-hold.  In the absence of meaningful benchmarks 
from referent organizations, alternative methods must be implemented by sponsors to evaluate 
performance of the potentially substantial investments in SOA that will be undertaken by 
numerous participants in SOA (e.g., SOA developers, service producers, and service 
consumers).   
Measuring Non-fiscal Returns 
Our research confirms that SOA expected returns are not always fiscally driven (e.g., 
compliance with law and regulation or loss of life is more important in many cases), and the 
SOA construct seeks to align mission and investments that involve promoting a service-oriented 
culture.  As a consequence, the research team proposes an expanded definition of ROI, to 
include return on closing capability gaps that are targeted by an SOA implementation that 
includes non-monetizable value propositions such as compliance with law and regulatory 
mechanisms, avoidance of loss of life and customer (e.g., government user or citizen) 
satisfaction.  This definition is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1. ROI Analysis Considerations for SOA 
Expectation Management 
Application of the expanded ROI methods, in an on-going performance management 
program, involves comparison of actual tangible and intangible results realized from selected 
SOA investments to realistic, initial investment expectations.  Initial expectations, in and of 
themselves, should reflect an incremental comparison of proposed SOA investment returns to 
those anticipated should current approaches be continued (i.e., the status quo, or “do nothing” 
case).  The value of ROI analysis for an on-going performance management program must be 
balanced against the resources required to perform the analysis and will also greatly depend 
upon the ability of Government sponsors to effectively characterize initial expectations from 
SOA in measurable terms.  According to ZapThink Research, “only by understanding the full 
range of SOA value propositions can companies begin to get a handle on calculating the ROI of 
SOA” (Schmelzer, 2005). 
Effective SOA Management Can Be Resource-intensive 
Application of ROI principles for SOA performance management will likely increase 
resources devoted to planning and monitoring efforts.  ROI analysis can be a relatively 
resource-intensive effort, and the research team has developed an approach to streamline the 
process (i.e., “ROI Lite”). This approach involves adoption of an Early Warning System that 
focuses on more frequent assessment of the “vital few” leading indicators of success/failure.  
Assessments take the form of variance analyses for key ROI variables (e.g., acquisition costs) 
and less frequent re-visiting of the overall ROI analysis itself (only required when variances are 
significant and suggest that either performance needs to be improved or re-baselining is 
necessary). 
ROI Analysis SOA investment
option
- List of priorities
- List of relative desirability
- Comparative customer satisfaction ratings
- Balanced Scorecard ratings
- Number of votes "for" and "against"
(1)  What are the social consequences?
(2)  What are the strategic implications?
(3) What is the effect on employee morale?
(4)  What are the political ramifications?
(5)  Stoplight matrix of risk assessment
Investment costs and benefits 
can be quantified, but not 
accurately monetized?
(e.g., customer satisfaction)
Investment costs and benefits 
can be monetized, but not 
easily?
(e.g., productivity)
Investment impacts cannot be 
accurately expressed 
monetarily?





Investment costs and benefits 
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Integrating Multiple Perspectives 
Another challenge in effectively managing SOA performance is the multitude of 
conflicting viewpoints regarding key SOA outcomes and which particular SOA-driven benefits 
can realistically be pursued.  This is often the result of confusion in benefit-related terminology 
(e.g., “flexibility” and “time savings”) and of differing stakeholder needs.  For instance, a primary 
benefit expected from SOA is the ability to expose services for potential re-use by other 
Government entities, which is typically an enterprise viewpoint; however, an executing program 
viewpoint could realistically be that the expected benefit from SOA relates to garnering flexibility 
to quickly respond to a change in the environment.  Since SOA supports the exposure of 
services with the intent of reuse, challenges also include the need to manage multiple inter-
Governmental and public-private performance relationships and uncertainty associated with 
future service demand and performance requirements. 
Establishing Stakeholder Targets 
The importance of addressing multiple SOA viewpoints, numerous stakeholder needs, 
and the uncertainty associated with the nature and magnitude of future service demand each 
increase the complexity associated with acquiring necessary services and capability from other 
Government entities and commercial industry.  Methods that address these limitations, 
challenges, and pressures for more effective and efficient SOA lifecycle performance 
management have not been widely adopted within Government settings.  Such methods are 
fundamental to determining whether both SOA business (e.g., cost savings through reuse) and 
technical (e.g., flexibility to meet operational needs) targets are being met in a mission-needs 
context and to manage a more complex stakeholder, provider and consumer environment. 
3.0  Applying Service-level Agreements (SLAs) to Manage SOA 
Service Provisioning 
Service-level Agreements (SLAs) have been a highly 
recommended and time-tested way (in some environments) to 
establish performance-related agreement between service providers 
and consumers (other methods, such as Memoranda of Agreement, 
are typically applied for service provider relationships between 
Government entities) (GSA, DoD, NASA, 2005).  And, effective 
application of SLAs can help address some of the challenges 
identified in Section 2.0 (e.g., expectation management, integrating 
multiple perspectives, and measuring non-fiscal returns).  An SLA is 
a formal, negotiated agreement between two parties.  It is a contract 
between customers and their service providers, and it records the 
common understanding about service features such as priorities, responsibilities, and 
guarantees.   
The main purpose of the SLA is to articulate agreements reached on the level of service 
to be provided.  For example, it may specify levels of availability, serviceability, performance, 
operation, or other service attributes, such as billing and even penalties in the case of violation 
of the SLA (“Service level agreement,” 2007).  SLAs have been applied for almost two decades 
by fixed-line telecom operators as part of their contracts with corporate customers.  More 
recently, some Information Technology (IT) enterprises have adopted the idea of using SLAs 
with their customers to allow for comparing delivered versus promised quality of service (2007). 
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Application of Service-level Agreements (SLA) is a recommended, but not required, 
method to describe performance expectations for services that are acquired by the Government 
from an external (i.e., commercial industry) service provider, and the use of SLAs is prevalent 
when services are acquired using Performance-based Acquisition (PBA) techniques. 
3.1  Government Experiences in Applying SLAs 
Government agency experiences with applying SLAs for managing contract performance 
objectives have been mixed.  In some instances, when SLAs have been applied and 
performance objectives are not effectively achieved, the primary reason for failure is that the 
SLAs that were initially created were not consistently applied, maintained, and updated (as 
necessary) throughout the contract period of performance.  In other instances, SLAs fail to 
support effective performance management because they are managed individually and without 
sufficient consideration of how all SLAs supporting a particular contract relate to one another to 
achieve overall outcomes.   
SLAs are often exclusively applied as a transactional and computer-generated 
communication of performance status, which minimizes their inherent power to form binding 
agreements between parties who may have competing agendas.  When efforts are undertaken 
by the Government to leverage SLAs as a means of achieving and maintaining meeting-of-the-
minds between a service provider and consumer, they are often difficult to enforce because of 
how and when the SLAs were connected to contractually oriented provisioning agreements.   
Administration of SLAs often becomes overly resource-intensive, and Government 
agencies are sometimes motivated to simply replace SLA monitoring efforts with other, 
potentially less authoritative, monitoring approaches.  Alternatively, Government organizations 
can simply become so involved in SLA administration that they understandably lose sight of 
performance interdependencies and exactly what performance really should be measured to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
While challenges associated with effective and efficient Government SLA application 
have existed for many years, the advent of SOA and increased pressures for agile service 
provisioning in web-enabled environments has added new and more pervasive challenges.  In 
these service-oriented environments, managing delivery against desired outcomes is complex 
and multi-dimensional, e.g., SLAs may be nested and may be dependent on separate 
application, hosting, and communications/networks performance needs.  The nature and 
magnitude of future service demand is frequently unclear.  And, capabilities will likely be jointly 
created and maintained by numerous internal and external organizations. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other government procurement policies can likely 
accommodate service-oriented provisioning needs, but comprehensive guidance is not available 
to support Government organizations in establishing SLA monitoring systems that effectively 
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3.2  Increasing SLA Effectiveness 
To increase the effectiveness of SLAs, they should state in measurable terms: 
 The service to be performed and outcome expectations, 
 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and the level of service that is acceptable for 
each, 
 The manner by which service is to be measured and how “success” is defined, 
 The parties involved and the responsibilities of each, 
 The reporting guidelines and requirements, and 
 Incentives for the service provider to meet the agreed-upon target levels of quality. 
Figure 3-2 illustrates recommended relational SLA elements. 
SLA Element Description
2.1 CONTEXT 
Purpose/Background Description of what the SLA has been designed to accomplish 
Stakeholders Identifies who cares about this performance and what they care most about 
Service Interdependencies Explains how the SLA and work scope fit into the entire supply chain 
2.2  SCOPE OVERVIEW 
Business Scope and Objectives A high level description of the SLA’s business objectives 
2.3  SERVICE DESCRIPTIONS 
Service Descriptions Detailed description of the services being provided through the agreement 
2.4  KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Service Levels/Performance 
Metrics 
Required performance and how service is to be delivered 
Data Requirements Data to be provided by the contractor to enable performance monitoring 
Security Management Security issues relevant to services provided 
Workload Constraints Highest expected level of service demand.  Degradation schedule if excessive 
demand 
Severity and Priority Levels Severity levels for service interruption/degradation; service restoration 
priorities 
2.5  ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Roles and Responsibilities Mutually agreed upon roles along with corresponding responsibilities for each 
team member 
2.6  RECOURSE/REWARD SCHEME 
Excused Performance Conditions under which the contractor will not held to the Absolute KPIs 
Escalation Procedures What actions to take if service delivery is not satisfactory 
Service Level Bonuses/Penalties Consequences for failing to meet Absolute KPIs; rewards for superlative 
performance 
2.7  REPORTING GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS 
Required Performance Reports Vendor’s performance reports to be delivered to government 
Update Procedures How, how often, and by whom, SLA should be updated 
Issues Management Procedures Responsibilities for surfacing and resolving problems/issues 
2.8  GLOSSARY 
Glossary of Terms Written to minimize misinterpretations 
  
Figure 3-2. Recommended Relational SLA Elements 
Key SLA lessons learned that should be considered include: 
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 Agree to existing service levels: Some Government agencies agree that the 
required service levels will be set at existing performance.  Doing so preserves the 
current service that the new contract was designed to improve (Delaney, 2004). 
 Agree to agree on service levels: Some Government agencies agree to work out 
service levels after contract award (2004).  However, once the contract is signed, the 
deal team often breaks up, and the provider may not be incentivized to subsequently 
agree to challenging service levels. 
 Agree to fix service levels at initial provider performance: Some Government 
agencies, with no basis for setting service levels, agree to set them at whatever 
levels the provider can achieve during the initial months of the contract.  This can 
give the provider an incentive to hold down service levels during those initial 
transitional months, that is, during a potentially volatile time in the contract term 
(2004).  
 Set the appropriate incentives: Some Government agencies overlook the idea that 
the provider will "manage to the money."  For example, in a call center contract, 
agencies might set a service level of "answer 90% of calls within two minutes" 
without realizing that they are, in effect, telling the provider to ignore any call that's 
gone over two minutes in favor of one that could still be answered in two minutes 
(2004).  
 Don’t ask for the moon: Government agencies should be careful about requiring 
unnecessarily high performance commitments.  Providing better service may require 
the provider to use, for example, redundant systems, excess capacity and better 
technology (2004). 
 Realize less is more: Government agencies should make SLAs simple and familiar. 
 Make SLAs measurable and actionable: Agencies should only collect data upon 
which they are going to base decisions; they should then pre-set the actions that will 
be followed if metrics do not hit targets. 
 Detail the unusual areas and boiler plate the rest: “Must-haves” should be 
articulated in the contract itself. 
 Describe methods for withholding/reducing fee: Loss of business/productivity is 
rarely compensated directly by a service provider.  Typically, a rebate proportional to 
the shortfall of the service vs. the payment is provided by the service provider in 
future performance evaluation periods.  SLAs typically include escalation procedures 
and conditions under which the provider will not be held responsible for service 
failings. 
 Incorporate contract language that allows SLAs to be changed: This language 
should tie to milestones as SLA changes may impact cost/schedule. 
Key reasons for failure of SLAs include: (a) The Government lacks well-defined 
requirements at the time of Request for Proposal (RFP) issuance, and (b) When 
Government/contractor performance interdependencies exist, the Government must have 
enough solid data on its own performance to counter contractor challenges.  
3.3  SLA Considerations for SOA Environments 
Ideally, IT and business stakeholders must work together to define realistic service-level 
criteria for SOA, especially for web services (Wainewright, 2003).  While traditional 
infrastructure SLAs typically measure “feeds and speeds,” SOA SLAs will often need to 
measure completed events.  Blending IT and business factors will require dialogue and 
feedback, which can be used to inform the performance measurement and management 
processes.  While the notion of measuring up to specific technical performance benchmarks is 
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well-established in the IT industry, the idea of defining service-level objectives in terms of 
business factors is less familiar.  Preparing and executing an SLA in a SOA environment 
presents special challenges.  Government organizations should follow some basic steps when 
they craft and manage SLAs in an SOA environment to mitigate risks associated with 
complexity and uncertainty (Perera, 2008).   
 Define desired outcomes: SLAs can support an articulation of desired outcomes 
between business and technology sides of the organization (2008).  And, it is 
recommended that SLAs align with the overall Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  
By design, an effective CONOPS will define the operational concept relative to 
overall objectives and will support an understanding of key interdependencies.  In a 
SOA environment, people should consider, from the outset, alternatives to business 
as usual.  Certainly, people can use SOA to perform the same business tasks that 
previous software performed, but this perpetuation can ignore the opportunities that 
SOA is supposed to create for flexibility and adaptability to changing business needs.   
 Match technical requirements to business needs: Software designers must select 
performance indicators for technical services, including service availability, 
bandwidth and response times.  Forrester Research uses the analogy of a consumer 
using an automated teller machine to explain how technical SLAs should be crafted.  
“It’s not enough that you put your card and Personal Identification Number (PIN) [in 
the machine] and request to withdraw cash.  There’s an expectation of how fast that 
will happen, the level of reliability and the level of security” (Perera, 2008).   
Varied business needs require different technical thresholds.  A military targeting 
application requires the highest levels of availability, whereas a civilian data analysis tool can 
probably operate at degraded performance levels outside of normal working hours.   
Because SOA applications have many loosely coupled services, SLAs can get 
complicated.  For example, software designers need performance guarantees if they’re going to 
reuse a service.  In that case, a technical SLA between the service provider and the service 
consumer will be necessary.  Each individual service might be in compliance with its technical 
SLA, and yet the overall application could still fail to meet its performance benchmarks.  SLAs 
cannot be an afterthought; they should become part of the system engineering process that 
occurs when SOA application developers are selecting services to incorporate or reuse.  
“However, from a user standpoint, a SOA application should have one SLA” (2008). 
 Monitor performance: A technical SLA provides information as to what 
performance is expected from a SOA application, but how does one know if the 
application meets that benchmark?  DISA’s Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) 
program created a SOA framework, a structured method for monitoring all service 
information going back and forth.  According to Computer Sciences Corporation 
(CSC), “The common framework captures […] service information regardless of the 
program or organizational entity” (Perera, 2008).  “Performance monitoring is an 
essential step in avoiding pass-the-buck arguments about who is responsible for 
performance failures.  Consider a scenario in which a service provider agrees to 
accept 10,000 consumer data queries in an hour.  The consumer’s service 
information shows that the queries are not exceeding that level, but the application 
isn’t responding.  Logs show that the consumer sent batches of 10,000 requests in 
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 Enforce the agreement: An agreement to provide service without a mechanism to 
penalize noncompliance is not much of an agreement.  But, this can sometimes 
occur with SOA SLAs.  “A user agency could say it has an SLA that guarantees 
performance levels, but a provider agency could argue that Congress doesn’t intend 
for the money it appropriates to the provider agency to be used to fix another 
agency’s IT problems” (2008).  Although under various laws, notably the Economy 
Act of 1933, agencies can contract for services from another agency, the law when 
applied to SOA “gets into some sticky areas that are way out of the purview of IT 
people,” said Randy Hite, director of IT architecture and systems issues at the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). “It starts getting lawyers involved.”  Partly 
because of those legal and funding issues, SOA studies show that only 5% of 
reusable services actually are reused (2008).  It’s easy to find examples of 
organizations failing to fulfill their SLA agreements.  For that reason, SLAs in the 
federal government are most effective within a single organization whose various 
parts are supported by the same source of funding.  Not going outside the 
organization for reusable services is perceived as prudent.  That constraint doesn’t 
necessarily apply to contracting with vendors for SOA services.  Government 
agencies can try to financially penalize a vendor for reusable services that fall short 
of agency expectations.  However, vendors are not eager to assume extra 
responsibility without getting paid (2008).  
4.0  A SOA SLA Governance Framework 
Government agencies should consider adopting an SLA 
governance framework to ensure that SLAs can be as effective as 
possible in managing performance and achieving overall outcomes.  
Such a framework can help rationally manage all the individual 
performance agreements and monitoring activities, especially when 
the Government is contracting for multiple and/or complex services.  
SLA governance is the ongoing process of reviewing performance 
measures and contrasting those results to the stated goals and 
targets.  Objectives of an SLA governance framework are to ensure 
that: 
 Performance standards, as communicated through SLAs, provide a clear 
understanding of how well the contractor is achieving overall service contract goals; 
 SLAs continue to describe performance deemed critical at the moment to 
achievement of overall outcomes;  
 SLAs and performance measures are prioritized according to their importance in 
achieving overall outcomes; and 
 All activities and surveillance are undertaken as effectively as possible in order to 
assess how effectively the provided services support the overall desired outcomes. 

















Figure 4-1. SLA Governance Framework Purpose, Goals, and Key Success Drivers 
An SLA governance framework should be designed so that all SLAs currently being 
applied to monitor performance: 
 Meaningfully describe progress toward achievement of specific outcomes in the 
context of overall contract objectives and in consideration of SLA interdependencies 
that may exist; and 
 Are objectively measured at the appropriate times and continually serve as the 
primary mechanism for objectively determining service provider payment and 
incentives (both positive and negative). 
The framework should assist Government leaders, contracting personnel, and Program 
Managers in consolidating, synthesizing, and rationalizing information related to service 
performance on a continuous basis—in such a way that performance status can be accurately 
determined at any point in time and readily translated into a robust characterization of how 
effectively vital outcomes are being achieved.  The SLA governance framework should clearly 
identify key service provisioning stakeholders, their performance expectations, and if/how their 
performance expectations are being satisfied.  The framework should enable the maintenance 
and improvement of service quality through a continuous cycle of agreeing, monitoring, and 
reporting upon service achievements and instigation of actions to eradicate poor service.  To be 
effective, the SLA governance framework should define roles and responsibilities for 
performance measurement and management.  The framework should also define the types of 
performance reviews that need to be conducted and the timing of these reviews.   
SLA governance does not begin when the SLA itself is documented; rather, governance 
refers to managing the entire process throughout the acquisition lifecycle.  The initial evaluation 
of current practices before the document is started, the writing of the SLA, the determination of 
key SLA participants and associated roles/responsibilities, the monitoring of the effort’s 
progress, as well as the need for any changes or updates to the agreement are all part of the 




SLA Governance Framework Purpose, Goals, and Key Success Drivers
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Government who are responsible for overseeing this process to ensure that the goals laid out in 
the SLA are realized.  The government and service providers must manage the relationship on 
an on-going basis by continuously monitoring performance, changing business needs and 
updating benchmarks.  At regularly agreed-upon intervals, the government should determine 
whether existing contracts need to be modified and new SLAs drafted.  Figure 4-2 details the 
proposed governance framework and the steps included in each of the four stages—Prepare, 






Figure 4-2. Proposed SLA Governance Framework 
Essential steps to successful SLA management include: 
 Define a service in understandable language.  This is the service. This is what 
it means. This is what is supported and what is not supported.  This is how it 
will be reported, communicated, charged. 
 Understand the costs at a granular level, identifying all the different cost 
elements involved in the delivery of a service. This will give IT the ability to 
also execute improvement programs aimed at further reducing these costs. 
 Price the service delivery accordingly. There will be projects in the future for 
which the business may not immediately see the value.  So price some of the 
services to allow for some buffer to pay for these yet-to-be-accepted services. 
 Implement differentiated charge-backs to reflect the differentiated levels of 
service you have on offer. 
 Have regular service reviews. Reviews are a communication and marketing 
mechanism for IT to show to business how it is improving and helping the 
business. Identify what else is needed by the business through this dialogue.  
A feedback loop is thus created in which both business and IT are able to 
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5.0  Conclusions 
Mechanisms are currently not consistently in place within the Federal Government for 
programs to identify key stakeholders, quantitatively articulate stakeholder needs, and 
quantifiably assess, on a timely basis, whether stakeholder needs have been satisfied.  The 
Comptroller General asks federal programs and agencies to improve performance management 
by:  
 Comprehensively reassessing what the federal government does and how it does it; 
reconsidering whether to terminate or revise outdated programs or services 
provided. 
 Reexamining the beneficiaries of federal programs; reconsidering who is eligible for, 
pays for, and/or benefits from a particular program to maximize federal investments. 
 Improving economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal operations; capturing 
opportunities to reduce costs through restructuring and streamlining federal activities. 
 Attacking activities at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement; focusing on 
minimizing risks and costs. (Mihm, 2000, July 20) 
MITRE research on performance management has resulted in recommendations to: (1) 
apply ROI analysis principles as the foundation for more effective performance management of 
Government SOA, (2) create comprehensive SLAs to articulate agreements between the 
Government and external service providers, and (3) manage SLAs through a governance 
framework. 
SOA involves multiple and complex participants (e.g., SOA developers, service 
providers, service consumers) and organizations (e.g., multiple Government organizations and 
commercial industry).  It also involves potential uncertainty associated with future performance 
expectations as services are exposed through the SOA; the nature and magnitude of future 
demand for services will likely not be known with certainty at the outset.  Careful planning must 
be undertaken by Government organizations to determine outcomes for multiple stakeholders 
and determine how those outcomes are translated to performance expectations that will be 
communicated to service providers. 
If SLAs are applied to support on-going SOA performance management, then efforts 
should be undertaken to directly connect these SLAs with technical performance requirements 
and ultimate SOA expectations.  The SLAs should be carefully crafted to ensure that flexibility 
for the Government to evolve performance expectations is maximized.   
For SLAs to be effective, a disciplined governance process must be undertaken by 
sponsors to ensure that the SLAs are actually measured and monitored.  On a timely basis, the 
SLAs should be re-evaluated to determine whether they are actually measuring something of 
importance and are still relevant to outcomes.   
The problem with SLAs is that once the ink has dried, the provision, monitoring, and 
management of these agreements can become the bone of contention between the 
people who are left to execute, monitor and manage the contract.  The need to manage 
SLAs is becoming a necessity if SLAs are to achieve any semblance of success.  
Without management, SLAs are like cars that go wildly off a highway.  You need checks 
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and balances to make sure that all concerned are running in the same direction and 
hopefully meeting all the obligations set forth in the contract. (“Managing,” 2007) 
With a performance management program in place, well-written and governed SLAs 
support government programs and provide transparent accountability to their stakeholders. 
Transparent accountability can support the Government in addressing challenges associated 
with complexity and uncertainty. 
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Appendix A. Acronyms 
CSC  Computer Sciences Corporation 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DISA  Defense Information Systems Agency 
FAR  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FCW  Federal Computer Week 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
IT  Information Technology 
KPI  Key Performance Indicator 
MOIE  Mission-oriented Investigation and Experimentation 
NCES  Net-centric Enterprise Services 
PBA  Performance-based Acquisition 
PIN  Personal Identification Number 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
ROI  Return on Investment 
SLA  Service-level Agreement  
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